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I
t is a favored pastime of medical 
editors and journalists (including 
ourselves) to criticize the World 
Health Organization (WHO) for, 
among other things, its “fossilized 
bureaucracy,” its lack of clear direction 
and priorities, the dysfunctional 
relationship between its headquarters 
and regional ofﬁ  ces, and its faltering 
steps towards building partnerships 
[1,2]. But with the arrival of so many 
new players on the global health scene, 
and the subsequent fragmentation of 
global health governance, we surely 
need WHO more than ever [3]. It is 
the best placed of all health agencies 
to coordinate the disparate, often 
overlapping global health initiatives 
and to set global norms and standards 
in health care, and its convening 
power (its ability to bring together 
experts) is unparalleled. Two recent 
WHO initiatives on preparing for and 
responding to global public health 
threats show the organization at its 
best, although there are, as always, 
some important caveats.
The ﬁ  rst initiative, described by 
Holger Schünemann and colleagues 
in this issue of PLoS Medicine, is the 
development and pilot testing of the 
new WHO Rapid Advice Guidelines 
Group [4]. WHO’s standard process 
for guideline development typically 
takes years of consultations and 
endless rounds of revisions, a process 
that is wholly inadequate for dealing 
with emergency health threats such 
as severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) or H5N1 avian inﬂ  uenza. In 
response to requests for advice from 
frontline clinicians and public health 
professionals on how to treat H5N1 
infections, WHO convened a new 
type of panel to issue rapid, evidence-
based advice. It took one month to 
convene an expert team, and ﬁ  ve 
weeks for the team to summarize the 
evidence and prepare draft guidelines. 
The guidelines were then discussed 
at a two-day meeting, after which a 
draft manuscript for publication was 
prepared within 10 days. 
In WHO terms, this time scale 
was miraculously quick, but there is 
clearly room for improvement—an 
even quicker time frame is likely to be 
needed for future health emergencies. 
The process could be expedited, 
say the authors, by identifying or 
establishing collaborating centers 
skilled in producing evidence-based 
guidelines and by building in-house 
capacity to reduce the time needed 
to organize a review team. It will also 
be vital for this new rapid advice 
group to make its process of panel 
selection as transparent as possible 
if the group is to garner the trust of 
the public health community. WHO 
has previously come under ﬁ  re for 
allowing industry to unduly inﬂ  uence 
its expert committees, and for failing 
to ensure that committee members 
declare their competing interests 
[3]. The rapid advice group must not 
sacriﬁ  ce transparency in the interests of 
urgency.
The second initiative is the 
long overdue 2005 revision of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR 
2005), which comes into force next 
month [5]. These regulations are an 
international legal instrument designed 
to ensure maximum protection against 
the international spread of infectious 
disease while minimizing restrictions 
on travel and trade. Up until the 2005 
revision, the regulations in force since 
1969 (IHR 1969) required notiﬁ  cation 
of just three diseases: yellow fever, 
cholera, and plague. The instrument 
was therefore hopelessly outdated 
for dealing with the new infectious 
diseases that have emerged at a rate 
of about one per year over the last 20 
years [6], or indeed for dealing with 
established threats such as pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza. IHR 1969 had several other 
limitations—for example, surveillance 
relied totally upon individual 
governments notifying WHO and there 
were no speciﬁ  c strategies to help 
build the capacity of resource-poor 
countries to monitor or respond to 
outbreaks [7]. Compliance was poor, 
in part because countries feared that 
reporting of outbreaks would lead 
to unwarranted and damaging travel 
and trade restrictions [5]. China’s 
initial reluctance to disclose the SARS 
pandemic was motivated by such fears 
[7]. 
Under IHR 2005, WHO member 
states are now required to notify 
WHO of “all events which may 
constitute a public health emergency 
of international concern,” which can 
include noninfectious events (such as 
chemical or radiation hazards) [5]. 
A new algorithm has been devised 
to aid states in determining what 
constitutes such an emergency. Criteria 
for reporting are whether the public 
health impact of the event is serious, 
whether it is unusual or unexpected, 
whether there is a risk of international 
spread, and whether there is a risk of 
international restrictions to trade and 
travel. The algorithm includes a long 
list of speciﬁ  c diseases that must always 
be notiﬁ  ed, such as viral hemorrhagic 
fevers, SARS, and human inﬂ  uenza 
caused by a new subtype. 
IHR 2005 requires all states to 
develop “core surveillance and 
response capacities” and requires 
WHO to assist in this development 
process. Each country must now 
have a “National IHR Focal Point” to 
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maintain communications between 
WHO and the member state. When 
an event is reported, WHO will guide 
the appropriate response by issuing 
time-limited recommendations to the 
member state tailored to the assessed 
risk of the event. An important new 
feature of IHR 2005 is that WHO can 
now use information about health 
emergencies not just from governments 
but from a range of sources, including 
nongovernmental organizations and 
the media. WHO can also raise the 
alarm itself about an emergency even 
when a country has not voluntarily 
notiﬁ  ed the organization. 
IHR 2005 is undoubtedly “a great 
step forward for international public 
health practice” [8]. On paper at least, 
the radical revision to the IHR, which 
took ten years to ﬁ  nalize, gives WHO 
the teeth it needs to prepare for and 
respond to any global health threat. 
But WHO will have to address several 
important concerns if IHR 2005 is to 
become a real force for strengthening 
our collective defenses against public 
health threats.
The ﬁ  rst, and most obvious, concern 
is that many developing countries lack 
the ﬁ  nancial resources to build core 
surveillance and response capacity. 
These countries will be unable to 
comply with IHR 2005 through no 
fault of their own. Unless WHO helps 
to mobilize new funding, an upgraded 
global surveillance and response system 
will remain just an aspiration. Donors 
have taken an interest in preparing for 
at least one “public health emergency 
of international concern”—pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza—but without a way of 
ensuring equitable distribution of funds, 
it is the donor countries themselves 
that will largely beneﬁ  t from these extra 
resources. For example, in December 
2005 the United States congress 
allocated $US3.8 billion to help prepare 
for the next pandemic, of which 
$US3.3 billion went to the Department 
of Health and Human Services [9]. 
Three-quarters of this departmental 
funding is allocated to the stockpiling 
of antiviral drugs and vaccines for use in 
the US, while only 3.8% is dedicated to 
“international activities.” Poor countries 
are understandably concerned that 
the stockpiling of tools for pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza control will be the preserve of 
the rich world. 
A related concern is that IHR 2005 
appears to have no remit to help 
developing countries deal with national 
public health emergencies. The event 
must be “of international concern” 
for the IHR machinery to kick in. It 
would arguably be better for a country 
to adopt a precautionary principle 
rather than to wait until a disease 
has crossed its borders to become an 
“international” epidemic. The woolly 
language of IHR 2005 also leaves 
the regulations open to the criticism 
that they are there simply to prevent 
infectious diseases of the poor world 
from encroaching upon rich countries. 
There are other potential barriers 
to the success of IHR 2005. The 
division of power within federations 
may make it difﬁ  cult for them to 
meet the surveillance and reporting 
requirements of IHR 2005 [10]. It is 
unclear whether the instrument will 
have any power to assist states that 
are not members of WHO, such as 
Taiwan, which suffered a major SARS 
outbreak in 2003 and which is at risk 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza. It is too soon 
to tell how IHR 2005 will interact with 
other guidelines on public health 
emergencies. The European Union, for 
example, already has its own network 
for reporting unusual events that may 
constitute a public health emergency 
[11]—does this network supersede 
the IHR 2005? And it is too soon to 
tell whether IHR 2005 gives countries 
enough of an incentive to report 
epidemics or whether compliance will 
be just as poor as with IHR 1969. 
IHR 2005 has been hailed as “a 
governance regime unlike anything 
in the history of international law on 
public health” [7]. Margaret Chan, 
WHO’s Director-General, believes 
that the new regulations give the 
organization the preemptive powers 
it needs to detect an outbreak early 
and stop it at its source [12]. IHR 2005 
certainly gives the health community 
a new tool that could promote 
collective action against global health 
threats, but the tool will be weakened 
unless the technical, logistical, and, 
most crucially, ﬁ  nancial hurdles are 
overcome.  
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